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Jamming-Robust Uplink Transmission for Spatially
Correlated Massive MIMO Systems
Hossein Akhlaghpasand, Emil Björnson, and S. Mohammad Razavizadeh
Abstract
In this paper, we consider how the uplink transmission of a spatially correlated massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) system can be protected from a jamming attack. To suppress the jamming, we propose a novel
framework including a new optimal linear estimator in the training phase and a bilinear equalizer in the data phase.
The proposed estimator is optimal in the sense of maximizing the spectral efficiency of the legitimate system attacked
by a jammer, and its implementation needs the statistical knowledge about the jammer’s channel. We derive an efficient
algorithm to estimate the jamming information needed for implementation of the proposed framework. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that optimized power allocation at the legitimate users can improve the performance of the proposed
framework regardless of the jamming power optimization. Our proposed framework can be exploited to combat
jamming in scenarios with either ideal or non-ideal hardware at the legitimate users and the jammer. Numerical
results reveal that using the proposed framework, the jammer cannot dramatically affect the performance of the
legitimate system.
Index Terms
Massive MIMO, spatial correlation, jamming suppression, hardware impairments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) has received extensive interests
and become the key physical-layer technology for the next generation wireless networks (5G) by providing
high-speed data services to a large number of users [1]−[3]. As the society becomes increasingly reliant
on the availability of wireless connectivity, it is of critical importance that future communication networks
become robust to jamming. Signal processing at the physical layer can provide a low-cost platform for
design of the jamming-robust communication links in massive MIMO systems [4], [5].
The physical layer processing against jamming can be divided into two categories: Jamming detection
and jamming suppression. For jamming detection, we exploit intentionally unused pilots in [6] to propose a
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2detector based on a generalized likelihood ratio test. Kapetanovic´ et al. utilize random training for detection
of the pilot contamination attack [7]. In [8], cooperative detection methods are proposed where the base
station (BS) and a legitimate user cooperate to detect pilot contamination attack. Xie et al. define a new
frame structure with a two-stages training phase with random intervals for detecting the pilot spoofing attack
[9].
There are some previous papers that provide the first steps towards a jamming-robust transmission
[10]−[13]. Vinogradova et al. suggest an approximate minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) combiner
based on random matrix theory to reject the jamming [10]. In [11], a receiver is proposed that exploits
channel estimates of both legitimate user and jammer to improve the spectral efficiency (SE). In [12],
we propose a framework including a novel MMSE based jamming suppression (MMSE-JS) estimator for
channel training and a zero-forcing jamming suppression (ZFJS) detector for uplink combining. Zhao et
al. suggest two anti-jamming algorithms based on cooperation between the transmitter and receiver with
perfect channel state information [13].
An active eavesdropper can be viewed as a jammer that transmits disturbing signals only in the pilot
phase for manipulating channel estimation in order to increase accuracy of its wiretap. Xiong et al. in [14]
maximize the secrecy rate in the presence of an active eavesdropper with a frame structure composing
two training phases. Wang et al. in [15] assign the beamforming coefficients such that the approximate
secrecy rate is maximized, while in [16], the asymptotic secrecy rate is derived assuming matched filter
beamforming and artificial noise generation at the BS. Optimal power control for preventing eavesdropping
in the downlink transmission of the cell-free massive MIMO systems is proposed in [17] for ideal hardware
and in [18] for non-ideal hardware. Previous works have either considered security problem in the presence
of active eavesdropper [14]−[18] or jamming suppression problem for only uncorrelated Rayleigh fading
channels [10]−[13]. In general, the jammer’s strategy depends on its objective and its available information.
Accordingly, in [5], [6], [11], [12], [15], the authors suppose that the pilot jamming attack is a combination
of several pilot sequences of the pilot set, while in [4], [7]−[10], [14], [16]−[18], the jammer selects a
target user’s pilot sequence as the jamming pilot.
In this paper, we propose a new framework for suppressing the jamming in the uplink transmission of the
massive MIMO systems with spatially correlated channels. The utilization of spatial correlation for jamming
suppression is a new dimension that has not been explored before in the literature. The contributions of
this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce a new jamming-robust framework including a SE-maximizing linear estimator and a
bilinear equalizer (BE). The proposed framework can perform well in the spatially correlated channels,
which is more applicable in practice.
3• We show that the performance of the proposed framework improves when the similarty between the
statistical knowledges of the jammer’s channel and the legitimate users’ channels decreases. The other
advantage of the proposed framework is acceptable performance in the high jamming power regime.
• We demonstrate that to implement the proposed framework in the first item, we need statistical
knowledge about the jammer’s channel. Thus, we derive an algorithm to estimate this knowledge by
exploiting the received signals over some consecutive coherence blocks.
• In the proposed framework, we study how the legitimate user (jammer) can optimally allocate its
power budget to the pilot and data phases to maximize (minimize) the performance of the legitimate
system. For jamming suppression in the spatially correlated channels, the problem of power allocation
has not been studied before in the literature.
• We also study the problem of jamming suppression with non-ideal transceiver hardware. To the
best of our knowledge, this problem also has not been considered in prior works. The effect of the
distortions from hardware impairments of the legitimate users and the jammer on the performance of
the proposed framework is investigated.
Numerical results demonstrate that massive MIMO systems equipped with the proposed framework are
more robust against jamming attacks than a framework consisting of the MMSE estimator and the zero-
forcing (ZF) detector. The simulations also indicate that the proposed framework performs well even if the
legitimate users and the jammer operate with non-ideal hardware.
Notations: The conjugate, transpose, and conjugate transpose of an arbitrary matrix X are respectively
denoted by X∗, XT , and XH , while tr (X) represents the trace of the matrix X. The Kronecker product of
two matrices X and Y is denoted by X ⊗ Y. The operator vec (X) yields the vector with the vectorization
elements of the matrix X. IN is the N × N identity matrix and 0 is the all-zero column vector.
II. UPLINK MASSIVE MIMO SETUP
We consider the uplink of a single-cell massive MIMO system, depicted in Fig. 1, containing one M-
antenna BS and K single-antenna legitimate users (hereafter called users). We assume that a single-antenna
jammer attacks a target user (e.g., the mth user) in order to reduce its SE. The model can be generalized
to the case that the jammer attacks all users. We denote by hk ∈ CM×1, k = 1, . . . , K the channel vector
from the kth user to the BS, which is modeled by hk ∼ CN (0,Rk), where Rk = E{hkhHk } ∈ CM×M is
the positive definite channel covariance matrix of the kth user. Moreover, hw ∈ CM×1 denotes the channel
vector from the jammer to the BS, where hw ∼ CN (0,Rw) and Rw = E{hwhHw } ∈ CM×M is the positive
definite channel covariance matrix of the jammer. We consider a block-fading model where the channels
are fixed within a coherence block of T samples and take independent realizations in each block.
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User 
User 
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Fig. 1: Massive MIMO uplink scenario under a jamming attack.
The users transmit their mutually orthonormal pilots to the BS at τ (K ≤ τ ≤ T) samples of a coherence
block in order to perform the channel estimation. During the remaining T − τ samples, the users transmit
data symbols to the BS. We denote by pt and pd the average transmit powers of the users over the pilot and
data phases, respectively. To analyze the worst-case impact of the jamming, we assume that the jammer is
smart and knows the transmission protocol. It uses different transmit powers qt and qd during jamming the
pilot and data phases, respectively. These powers can be optimized to make the jamming as effective as
possible in reducing the SE.
A. Pilot Phase
The pilots of the users are selected from an orthonormal pilot set {φ1, . . . ,φτ} in which φi ∈ Cτ×1 is the
ith pilot and
φTi φ
∗
l =

1, l = i,
0, l , i.
(1)
We assume that a smart jammer is aware of the pilot sequence assigned to the target user (i.e., the mth
user).
1) Pilot Jamming Attack: The jammer selects the mth user’s pilot sequence as the jamming pilot in order
to reduce that user’s channel estimation quality and thereby limit the SE of the user.
2) Channel Estimation: In the pilot phase, the users send their allocated pilots and the jammer transmits
the mth user’s pilot to create intentional pilot contamination. The received signal Yt ∈ CM×τ at the BS is
given by
Yt =
√
τpt
K∑
i=1
hiφ
T
i +
√
τqthwφ
T
m + Nt, (2)
5where Nt ∈ CM×τ is the normalized receiver noise matrix composed of i.i.d. CN(0, 1) elements. The
projection of Yt on the kth user’s pilot sequence is
yk = Ytφ
∗
k =

√
τpthm +
√
τqthw + nm, k = m,
√
τpthk + nk, k , m,
(3)
where nk = Ntφ
∗
k
∼ CN (0, IM). Any linear estimate of the channel hk based on yk is obtained as
hˆk = Akyk, (4)
where Ak ∈ CM×M is a deterministic matrix dependent on the channel statistics. The estimate hˆk is a
zero-mean random vector with covariance matrix AkBkA
H
k
, where Bk is the covariance matrix of yk :
Bk , E
{
yky
H
k
}
=

τptRm + S
(t)
w
+ IM, k = m,
τptRk + IM, k , m,
(5)
and S
(t)
w
, τqtRw. Unlike the MMSE method [19] that determines Ak to minimize the mean-squared error
(MSE), we will discuss later how to calculate Ak to suppress the interference caused by the jammer.
B. Data Phase
The normalized complex symbols xi and xw are simultaneously transmitted by the ith user and the jammer
during the data phase. The received data signal yd ∈ CM×1 at the BS is given by
yd =
√
pd
K∑
i=1
hi xi +
√
qdhwxw + nd, (6)
where nd ∈ CM×1 is the normalized receiver noise distributed as nd ∼ CN(0, IM). The covariance matrix
of yd is
Q , E
{
ydy
H
d
}
= pd
K∑
i=1
Ri + S
(d)
w
+ IM, (7)
where S
(d)
w
, qdRw. The BS filters the data signal yd with a linear detector vk to detect the signal of the
kth user:
xˆk = v
H
k yd =
√
pd
K∑
i=1
vHk hi xi +
√
qdv
H
k hwxw + v
H
k nd . (8)
The BE based on the channel estimate in (4), vk = hˆk , is a low-complexity detector that is known as a
good match for massive MIMO systems [20]. Since BE provides a linear processing with respect to the
6data signal yd and also the pilot signal yk in (4), i.e., xˆk = y
H
k
AH
k
yd, we can design the matrix Ak such
that the SE of the kth user in the presence of jamming is maximized. An identical expression for (8) in
the case of using the BE detector is
xˆk =
√
pdE
{
hˆHk hk
}
xk + nˆk, (9)
where nˆk represents the interferences plus noise and is given by
nˆk ,
√
pd
K∑
i=1
hˆHk hi xi −
√
pdE
{
hˆHk hk
}
xk +
√
qdhˆ
H
k hwxw + hˆ
H
k nd . (10)
The desired signal from the kth user is decoded by treating nˆk as noise [1], leading to the following
achievable SE.
Lemma 1. Using the BE detector with correlated Rayleigh fading, an achievable SE of the kth user is
obtained as
Sk =
(
1 − τ
T
)
log2 (1 + ρk) , (11)
where ρk represents the effective signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the kth user and is given
by
ρk =

τpt pd
 tr (AHmRm) 2
τqtqd
 tr (AHmRw) 2 + tr (AHmQAmBm) , k = m,
τpt pd
 tr (AH
k
Rk
)2
tr
(
AH
k
QAkBk
) , k , m. (12)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
Remark 1. Comparing the effective SINRs in (12) for two cases k = m and k , m, the jammer decreases
the effective SINR of the mth user (i.e., the target user) more than the effective SINRs of the other users,
since it creates the contamination only on the pilot of the target user.
The first term in the denominator of the mth user’s SINR in (12), which is caused by the pilot con-
tamination, is similar to the desired term in the numerator. Therefore, to reduce it without decreasing the
desired term, the covariance matrices Rm and Rw should be linearly independent. In an uncorrelated fading
channel, the covariance matrices are scaled identity matrices and the above independency is not satisfied.
However, in spatially correlated fading channels, the covariance matrices can be linearly independent. Hence,
utilization of the spatial correlation provides an opportunity for design of a processing to reduce the pilot
contamination caused by the jammer.
7III. ROBUST UPLINK TRANSMISSION AGAINST JAMMING ATTACK
In this section, we discuss how to design the matrix Ak in (4), in order to reduce the jammer’s effect in
the SINR in (12).
A. Jamming-robust Channel Estimation
The proposed approach for design of an optimal estimator is determining Ak such that the effective SINR
in (12) is maximized. We call this approach as “maximum SE (MS)”.
Theorem 1. The optimal vector a⋆
k
, vec(A⋆
k
) ∈ CM2×1 which maximizes (12) can be obtained as
a⋆k =

(
BTm ⊗ Q + s(t)w s(d)
H
w
)−1
rm, k = m,(
BTk ⊗ Q
)−1
rk, k , m,
(13)
where rk = vec(Rk) ∈ CM2×1, s(t)w = vec(S(t)w ) ∈ CM
2×1 and s(d)
w
= vec(S(d)
w
) ∈ CM2×1.
Proof:
Please refer to Appendix B. 
By using the optimal estimator, we can explicitly compute the optimal effective SINR as
ρ⋆k =

τpt pdr
H
m
(
BTm ⊗ Q + s(t)w s(d)
H
w
)−1
rm, k = m,
τpt pdr
H
k
(
BTk ⊗ Q
)−1
rk, k , m.
(14)
B. Jamming Channel Statistics
To implement the MS for the target user, we need to know the jamming channel statistics S
(t)
w
and
S
(d)
w
. To estimate S
(t)
w
, we can exploit the pilot signal ym = Ytφ
∗
m over N coherence blocks denoted by
ym [1] , . . . , ym [N] for the mth pilot signal and obtained from the pilot already used for channel estimation.
Regarding (5), S
(t)
w
is obtained as
S
(t)
w
= Bm − τptRm − IM . (15)
To compute S
(t)
w
in (15), all variables except Bm are known or estimated before the jamming attack. Hence,
we need to estimate Bm in order to obtain S
(t)
w
which is estimated from the law of large numbers and the
ergodicity of the channels:
Bˆm =
1
N
N∑
n=1
ym [n] (ym [n])H . (16)
8ρ˜k =
τpt pd
(
1 − κ2u
)2  tr (AHmRm)2
qtqd
(
τ − (τ − 1) κ2
w
)  tr (AHmRw)2 + pt pdκ2u ∑Ki=1  tr (AHmRi)2 + τpt pdκ2u (1 − κ2u )  tr (AHmRm)2 + tr (AHmQAmB˜m) , k = m
τpt pd
(
1 − κ2u
)2  tr (AH
k
Rk
)2
qtqdκ
2
w
 tr (AHk Rw)2 + pt pdκ2u ∑Ki=1  tr (AHk Ri)2 + τpt pdκ2u (1 − κ2u )  tr (AHk Rk)2 + tr (AHk QAkB˜k ) , k , m
(34)
Finally, using (15) and (16), we can estimate S
(t)
w
as
Sˆ
(t)
w
= Bˆm − τptRm − IM . (17)
In addition, to estimate S
(d)
w
, the BS knows the users’ covariance matrices and their transmit powers in
the data phase, thus from (7), we have
Sˆ
(d)
w
= Qˆ − pd
K∑
i=1
Ri − IM . (18)
The BS exploits the data signal yd over N coherence blocks to estimate Qˆ as
Qˆ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
yd [n] (yd [n])H . (19)
The standard deviation of the sample estimates in (16) and (19) is proportional to 1/
√
N , therefore even
with a relatively small N , we can get good estimates.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
We consider two main questions as follows: From the system’s point of view, how should each user
allocate its power budget to the pilot and data phases in order to maximize effective SINR ρ⋆m?, and from
the jammer’s point of view, how does the jammer allocate its power budget to the pilot and data phases in
order to minimize ρ⋆m?
The power budgets for each user and the jammer are denoted by P and Pw [21], respectively, where the
constraint on the transmit powers of each user is
τpt + (T − τ) pd = PT, (20)
and the transmit powers of the jammer satisfy
9τqt + (T − τ) qd = PwT . (21)
A. System’s Standpoint
From the system’s point of view, the optimal values pot and p
o
d
are derived from the following optimization
problem
L :

maximize
pt,pd
ρ⋆m
subject to τpt + (T − τ) pd = PT,
pt ≥ 0, pd ≥ 0,
(22)
where the jamming channel statistics S
(t)
w
and S
(d)
w
can be acquired using the sample estimates in Section
III-B. We cannot generally show that the objective function in L is concave, however the optimal values
pot and p
o
d
can be found numerically. This should be taken into consideration that the relaxation methods,
such as those proposed by [17], [18] for the uncorrelated fading channels, are impractical in our setup with
the correlated fading channels. Moreover, we can analytically obtain useful insights into pot and p
o
d
in one
interesting scenario that is Pw ≫ P ≥ 1.
Corollary 1. In the case of Pw ≫ P ≥ 1, the solution for L is given by

pot =
PT
2τ
,
pod =
PT
2 (T − τ) .
(23)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. 
For a given coherence interval T and the power budget P, the optimal transmit powers for each user
depend on the pilot length τ, so that
τpot = (T − τ) pod =
PT
2
. (24)
This means that the optimal power allocation is equally dividing the power budget between the pilot and
data phases against a high power jammer.
B. Jammer’s Standpoint
Now, we consider the power allocation from the jammer’s point of view. The smart jammer can acquire
the channel statistics, pt and pd to impose the maximum loss to the SE of the target user. In this case, the
optimization problem is
10
J :

minimize
qt,qd
ρ⋆m
subject to τqt + (T − τ) qd = PwT,
qt ≥ 0, qd ≥ 0.
(25)
We use the next theorem to efficiently solve J.
Theorem 2. J is a convex optimization problem.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. 
We conclude that the optimal values qot and q
o
d
can be found by any convex optimization tool.
Corollary 2. When the power budget of the jammer is high (i.e., Pw ≫ P ≥ 1), the solution for J is given
by 
qot =
PwT
2τ
,
qod =
PwT
2 (T − τ) .
(26)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E. 
The jammer assigns equal powers to both the pilot and data phases to minimize the SE of the target user,
when the jamming power budget is high.
C. Computational Complexity
The optimization problem L relies on the channel statistics, thus it only needs to be solved once for a
given setup. To find the optimal values numerically for one setup, we denote the ratio of the power budget
that each user allocates to the pilot phase by φ ∈ (0, 1), thus we have pt = φPT/τ and pd = (1−φ)PT/(T−τ)
which satisfy the constraints in L. We should compute ρ⋆m just for a few values of the variable φ (e.g., 99
values with equal step size 0.01) in the interval (0, 1), and then compare the results to find their maximum
value. For each value of φ, we compute the inversion of a matrix with dimensions M2 × M2 to obtain
ρ⋆m according to (14), subsequently the complexity is of the order M
6. To reduce the complexity, we can
rewrite (14) as
ρ⋆m = τpt pd
(
tr
(
RHmQ
−1RmB−1m
)
−
tr
(
RHmQ
−1S(t)
w
B−1m
)
× tr
(
S
(d)H
w
Q−1RmB−1m
)
1 + tr
(
S
(d)H
w
Q−1S(t)
w
B−1m
) ), (27)
following the matrix inversion lemma [3] and the equality (45) in Appendix. Utilizing (27), the inversion is
computed for the matrices with dimensions M ×M and consequently the order of the complexity is reduced
to M3. Following a similar approach, for the problem J in (25), the complexity is obtained of the order
M3.
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V. JAMMING-ROBUST MASSIVE MIMO UPLINK WITH HARDWARE IMPAIRMENTS
The previous sections considered robustness towards jamming for a massive MIMO system with ideal
transceiver hardware. However, practical transceivers are equipped with non-ideal hardware that creates
distortion in the system. In this section, we investigate how the distortions from hardware impairments at
the users and the jammer affect the proposed method for combating jamming.
A. Pilot Phase Under Hardware Impairments
The distortion caused by the hardware impairments at a user/jammer is modeled by a reduction of the
signal amplitude related to the impairment level and the additive Gaussian distortion with a power that
equals to the reduction in the signal powers [18], [23] as
Yt =
K∑
i=1
hi
(√
τpt
(
1 − κ2u
)
φTi + η
T
i
)
+ hw
(√
τqt
(
1 − κ2
w
)
φTm + η
T
w
)
+ Nt, (28)
where κu and κw represent the impairment levels at the users and the jammer respectively that are in the
ranges of 0 ≤ κu ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ κw ≤ 1. It is assumed that the distortion terms ηi and ηw are independently
distributed as
ηi ∼ CN
(
0, ptκ
2
uIτ
)
and ηw ∼ CN
(
0, qtκ
2
w
Iτ
)
. (29)
In the system with non-ideal hardware, the channel estimation is more complicated due to the distortion
terms. A basic estimate of hk can be obtained from
yk = Ytφ
∗
k =

√
τpt
(
1 − κ2u
)
hm +
K∑
i=1
εmi hi+√
τqt
(
1 − κ2
w
)
hw + ε
m
w
hw + nm, k = m,√
τpt
(
1 − κ2u
)
hk +
K∑
i=1
εki hi + ε
k
w
hw + nk, k , m,
(30)
where εk
i
, ηT
i
φ∗
k
∼ CN(0, ptκ2u) and εkw , ηTwφ∗k ∼ CN(0, qtκ2w) that are independent of the channels. We
exploit hˆk = Akyk as a linear estimate of the kth user’s channel. The covariance matrix of yk in (30) is
given by
12
B˜k = E
{
yky
H
k
}
=

τpt
(
1 − κ2u
)
Rm+
ptκ
2
u
K∑
i=1
Ri + S˜
(t)
w
+ IM, k = m,
τpt
(
1 − κ2u
)
Rk+
ptκ
2
u
K∑
i=1
Ri + S˘
(t)
w
+ IM, k , m,
(31)
where S˜
(t)
w
, qt
(
τ − (τ − 1) κ2
w
)
Rw and S˘
(t)
w
, qtκ
2
w
Rw.
B. Robust Data Phase Under Hardware Impairments
The received signal at the BS during the data phase for the case of hardware impairments at the users
and the jammer is modeled by
yd =
K∑
i=1
hi
(√
pd
(
1 − κ2u
)
xi + ηi
)
+ hw
(√
qd
(
1 − κ2
w
)
xw + ηw
)
+ nd . (32)
Lemma 2. Under hardware impairments, an achievable SE of the kth user in (11) becomes
Sk =
(
1 − τ
T
)
log2 (1 + ρ˜k) , (33)
where the effective SINR, ρ˜k , is given by (34), shown at the top of the previous page.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1, except that the numerator and second term in
the denominator of the SINR in (39) are multiplied by (1 − κ2u). 
While the hardware impairments at the users reduce the gain in the numerator of the SINR in (34) by
a factor (1 − κ2u)2 and also unwanted pilot-contaminating interferers (i.e., the second and third terms in
the denominator), the hardware impairment at the jammer also creates pilot-contaminating interference that
imposes additional reduction in the SINR. The reduction of the SINR through the non-ideal hardware of
the jammer is more for the mth user in comparison with the other users, since τ − (τ − 1) κ2
w
≥ κ2
w
due to
the bound of κw ≤ 1.
To derive the MS estimator in the case of non-ideal hardware, (34) can first be rewritten as
ρ˜k =
τpt pd
(
1 − κ2u
)2
aH
k
rkr
H
k
ak
aH
k
C˜kak
, (35)
where C˜k is the M
2 × M2 matrix defined by
13
ρk =
pd
E {hˆH
k
hk
}2
pd
∑K
i=1 E
{hˆH
k
hi
2} − pd E {hˆHk hk}2 + qdE {hˆHk hw 2} + E {hˆk2} (39)
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Fig. 2: CDF of SE for each user computed on 1000 different random locations of the jammer and fading variations over the array.
C˜k ,

B˜Tm ⊗ Q + s˜(t)w s(d)
H
w
+ pt pdκ
2
u
K∑
i=1
rir
H
i +
τpt pdκ
2
u
(
1 − κ2u
)
rmr
H
m, k = m,
B˜Tk ⊗ Q + s˘(t)w s(d)
H
w
+ pt pdκ
2
u
K∑
i=1
rir
H
i +
τpt pdκ
2
u
(
1 − κ2u
)
rkr
H
k , k , m,
(36)
where s˜
(t)
w
= vec(S˜(t)
w
) ∈ CM2×1 and s˘(t)
w
= vec(S˘(t)
w
) ∈ CM2×1. As a result, the MS estimator can be
readily extended as a⋆
k
= C˜−1
k
rk in this case. Consequently, the optimal effective SINR is computed as
ρ˜⋆
k
= τpt pd(1 − κ2u)2rHk C˜−1k rk . We can apply the MS approach using the matrix C˜k in (36) and during
the sample estimate of the matrices S˜
(t)
w
and S˘
(t)
w
, the observations of the pilot signals yk = Ytφ
∗
k
are
accomplished from Yt in (28) over N coherence blocks.
Finally, in the case of non-ideal hardware, the optimal power allocation between the pilot and data phases
from the system’s and the jammer’s point of view is analyzed similar to the case of ideal hardware.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We consider a square cell of 250 m×250 m composed of one BS located at the cell center and K users
that are randomly distributed in the cell with a minimum distance of 25 m from the BS. We assume a
coherence block of T = 200 samples with a pilot length τ = K . For uncorrelated Rayleigh fading channels,
it was shown in the literature [11], [12] that the massive MIMO uplink is robust against jamming attacks
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with a MMSE-like estimator and a ZF-like detector. Hence, here we compare the performance of the MS
approach with a framework including a MMSE estimator and a ZF detector (with label “MMSE-ZF”) as a
benchmark. To compute the SE for the MMSE-ZF, we utilize Monte-Carlo simulations over at least 1000
independent runs. In the simulations, we include the noise variance in what we call the large-scale fading
coefficients, not in the transmit powers, thus the transmit powers can be interpreted as the signal-to-noise
ratios and their units are expressed in dB. In the scenario with non-ideal hardware, the impairment levels
for the users and the jammer are set to κu = κw = 0.1.
For all the users and the jammer, the covariance matrices are computed as a combination of the Gaussian
local scattering model and log-normal large-scale fading variations over the array [2, Ch. 2]:
[Rl]mn =
βl10( f lm+ f ln)/20√
2πσϕ
∫
e
jπ(m−1)(n−m) sin(θl+ϕ)− ϕ
2σ2ϕ dϕ, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} ∪ {w} . (37)
The parameters in (37) are as follows:
βl : Average large-scale fading (depends on the distance
from the BS and includes the noise variance).
θl : Angle-of-arrival (AoA).
f lm, f
l
n : Independent large-scale fading variations distributed
as N
(
0, σ2
)
. The standard deviation is denoted by σ.
σϕ: Angular standard deviation (σϕ = 10
◦).
To perform the simulations of Fig. 2, Fig. 3, and Fig. 4, we use a realization of the introduced network
containing a 64-antenna BS and 3 users with locations (−57.6 m, 112.2 m), (44.4 m,−83.1 m), and
(103.8 m,−22.2 m). One jammer also exists in the network that attacks the 3rd user as a target. We
set the standard deviation of the large-scale fading variations to σ = 4.
Fig. 2 illustrates the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the SE for each user computed on 1000
different random locations of the jammer and fading variations over the array. The curves are plotted for
pt = pd = −5 dB and qt = qd = 15 dB in both scenarios with ideal and non-ideal hardware. The comparison
shows that the MS approach generally performs better than the MMSE-ZF specially in the case of the
non-ideal hardware at the transmitters. Moreover, the robustness level of the system during the detection of
the 3rd user’s symbols (i.e., the target user’s symbols) under the jamming attacks is dominantly improved
using the MS approach compared to the MMSE-ZF.
We evaluate the impact of power allocations on the performance of the system in Fig. 3. In these
simulations, the location of the jammer is near to the target user in order to create a channel correlation
matrix Rw similar to the channel correlation matrix R3. It intuitively seems that the jammer can more easily
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Fig. 3: SE of user 3 (target user) versus (a) transmit power ratio
pt
pd
, (b) jamming power ratio
qt
qd
.
spread its jamming signals on the subspace of the target user by choosing a location near to the target user.
For instance, here we assume that the jammer’s location is (107.9 m,−17.1 m). Fig. 3(a) illustrates how
the SE of the target user depends on the transmit power ratio
pt
pd
for qt = qd = 15 dB and P = 5 dB in the
scenarios with the ideal and non-ideal hardware, while in Fig. 3(b), the SE of the target user is depicted
versus the jamming power ratio
qt
qd
for pt = pd = −5 dB and Pw = 20 dB at the same scenarios. we can see
that in Fig. 3(a), the SEs have the peak values in certain power ratios
pt
pd
. In other words, the users should
balance their power budgets between the pilot and data signals to get the best achievable SEs. Similarly in
Fig. 3(b), the SEs have the minimum values in certain ratios
qt
qd
. Therefore, the jammer can divide its power
budget between the pilot and data phases to minimize the achievable SE of the target user. Furthermore,
comparing Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) indicates that the performance of the MMSE-ZF dramatically reduces
when the jammer’s power budget increases compared to the users’ power budget, such that its SE in Fig.
3(b) varies near the zero; whereas the MS approach is more robust against jamming attacks even with
strong jamming powers.
Finally, we evaluate the accuracies of the sample estimations for Sˆ
(t)
w
in (17) and Sˆ
(d)
w
in (18). We consider
pt = pd = −10 dB and the location of the jammer is identical to that location in the simulations of Fig. 3.
We plot the SE of the MS approach for all 3 users versus the jamming powers qt = qd in Fig. 4 for ideal
hardware and two cases that are perfect knowledge about S
(t)
w
and S
(d)
w
, and the sample estimates of Sˆ
(t)
w
and
Sˆ
(d)
w
over N = 1000 coherence blocks. It demonstrates that the SEs resulted from the estimations in (17)
and (18) nearly behave the actual SEs for all 3 users. Accordingly, it is expected that the achievable SEs
can be realized without the perfect knowledge of the jamming channel statistics. Furthermore, we can see
in Fig. 4 that the SEs become non-zero in the high jamming power regime. This is because we can estimate
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Fig. 4: SEs of the MS approach versus the jamming powers qt = qd for the ideal hardware and pt = pd = −10 dB.
the jammer’s interference better for a high power jammer, and therefore remove its impact spatially by
exploiting our proposed robust framework.
Another realization of the introduced network with 5 users are utilized to perform the next simulation to
show the effect of the number of the BS antennas on the performance of the MS approach. The locations
of the users are (−59.1 m,−91.6 m), (32.6 m,−113.3 m), (25.1 m, 116.9 m), (94.0 m, 106.3 m), and
(33.2 m, 1.6 m). One jammer located in (37.0 m, 6.2 m) attacks the 5th user as a target. We use (37) to
carry out the simulation of the correlation matrices except that here we ignore the fading variations over the
array, i.e., f lm = f
l
n = 0. In Fig. 5, the SEs of the users 1, 3, and 5 are illustrated with respect to the number
of BS antennas for P = 5 dB and Pw = 25 dB. Since the SEs of the users 1, 2, 3, and 4 (i.e., the users that
are not the target of the jammer) are similar, we indicate the SEs of the users 1, and 3 as examples. The
users and the jammer transmit the signals in the pilot and data phases with the transmit powers allocated
by (23) and (26), respectively. It is clear that the performance of the proposed framework improves for the
large antenna arrays. This improvement is substantial in the target user (i.e., the 5th user) such that the SE
of the MS approach grows by increasing the number of antennas, while for the MMSE-ZF, the SE remains
nearly zero.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the protection of the massive MIMO uplink with the spatially correlated
Rayleigh fading against jamming attacks. A new jamming-robust framework has been proposed consisting
of a new MS approach as an optimal channel estimator with respect to the SE of the system. A practical
algorithm has been also suggested to acquire the jamming statistical knowledge needed for implementation
of the proposed framework. We have shown that a massive MIMO system equipped with the proposed
framework is more robust against jamming compared to the MMSE-ZF framework. We have also shown that
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Fig. 5: SEs of the users 1, 3, and 5 with respect to the number of the BS antennas M for P = 5 dB and Pw = 25 dB.
the power allocations at the users can improve the performance of the proposed framework regardless of the
jamming power optimization. Finally, the performance of the proposed framework has been mathematically
and numerically studied when the hardware impairments exist at the users and the jammer. The analyses
show that the proposed framework performs well in the case of non-ideal hardware for both the attacked
user and other users that are not the target of the jammer.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
An achievable SE of the kth user is
Sk =
(
1 − τ
T
)
log2 (1 + ρk) , (38)
with the effective SINR of the kth user, ρk , is obtained as in (39), shown at the top of the previous page.
The expectations in (39) are computed in closed form as follows:
E
{
hˆHk hk
}
=
√
τpt tr
(
AHk Rk
)
, (40)
E
{hˆHk hi2} =

τpt
 tr (AHk Rk )2 +
tr
(
AHk RkAkBk
)
, k = i,
tr
(
AHk RiAkBk
)
, k , i,
(41)
E
{hˆHk hw 2} =

τqt
 tr (AHmRw)2 +
tr
(
AHmRwAmBm
)
, k = m,
tr
(
AHk RwAkBk
)
, k , m,
(42)
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E
{hˆk2} = tr (AHk AkBk ) . (43)
By plugging (40)−(43) into (39), and utilizing Q = IM + S(d)w + pd
∑K
i=1 Ri, we finally obtain (11).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
According to am , vec(Am) ∈ CM2×1 and the vectorized form of the jamming channel statistic rw =
vec (Rw) ∈ CM2×1 and rm, the effective SINR in (12) is rewritten as
ρm =
τpt pda
H
mrmr
H
mam
aHms
(t)
w
s
(d)H
w
am + a
H
m
(
BTm ⊗ Q
)
am
, (44)
for k = m, where s
(t)
w
, s
(d)
w
are the vectorized form of S
(t)
w
= τqtRw and S
(d)
w
= qdRw, and we use the
Kronecker product to express matrix multiplication as
tr
(
AHmQAmBm
)
= aHm vec (QAmBm)
= aHm
(
BTm ⊗ Q
)
am. (45)
By defining the new matrix Cm , B
T
m ⊗ Q + s(t)w s(d)
H
w
and making the change of variable a¯m = C
1
2
mam, we
have
ρm =
a¯HmC
− 1
2
m rmr
H
mC
− 1
2
m a¯m
a¯Hm a¯m
=
a¯HmC− 12m rm
2
‖a¯m‖2
. (46)
According to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the numerator, ρm is maximized when a¯
⋆
m = C
− 1
2
m rm, which
leads to a⋆m = C
−1
m rm.
For k , m, the analysis is similar to k = m, except that the first term in the denominator of the SINR in
(44) is ignored.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
Regarding (14), ρ⋆m is approximated to
ρ⋆m = τpt pdr
H
m
(
S
(t)T
w
⊗ S(d)
w
+ s
(t)
w
s
(d)H
w
)−1
rm, (47)
for Pw ≫ P ≥ 1. This approximation is exact as Pw →∞. We can see that in (47), ρ⋆m is a linear function
of the multiplication pt pd. Hence, L equals to
L
′ :

maximize
pt,pd
pt pd
subject to τpt + (T − τ) pd = PT,
pt ≥ 0, pd ≥ 0.
(48)
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Utilizing the first constraint in L′, the objective function reduces to
pt pd =
PT
T − τ pt −
τ
T − τ p
2
t . (49)
By differentiating (49) with respect to pt and equating it to zero, we obtain
PT
T − τ −
2τ
T − τ pt = 0, (50)
which has the optimal values
pot =
PT
2τ
, (51)
and
pod =
PT
2 (T − τ) . (52)
We note that the optimal values in (51) and (52) satisfy the second and the third constraints in L′.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
We denote the ratio of the jamming power budget allocated to the pilot phase by ζ (0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1) so that
qt =
ζPwT
τ
and qd =
(1 − ζ ) PwT
(T − τ) . (53)
Since the jamming transmit powers in (53) satisfy all constraints in (25), J is equivalent to
J′ :

minimize
ζ
ρ⋆m (ζ )
subject to 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1,
(54)
by substituting (53) into the objective function in (25). It is obvious that the constraint in J′ results in
a convex feasible set. Furthermore, we use the second-order conditions [22] to indicate that the objective
function is convex. The second derivative of ρ⋆m (ζ ) is equal to
∂2ρ⋆m (ζ )
∂ζ2
= τpt pdr
H
mUm (ζ ) rm, (55)
where
Um (ζ ) , Γ−1m (ζ )
(
2Λm (ζ )Γ−1m (ζ )Λm (ζ ) − Υm (ζ )
)
Γ
−1
m (ζ ) . (56)
The matrices Γm (ζ ), Λm (ζ ) and Υm (ζ ) are given by
Γm (ζ ) ,
ζ (1 − ζ ) P2
w
T2
(T − τ) Γw + ζPwTΛw +
(1 − ζ ) PwT
(T − τ) Ψm + (τptRm + IM)
T ⊗
(
pd
K∑
i=1
Ri + IM
)
, (57)
Λm (ζ ) ,
∂Γm (ζ )
∂ζ
=
(1 − 2ζ ) P2
w
T2
(T − τ) Γw + PwTΛw −
PwT
(T − τ)Ψm, (58)
Υm (ζ ) ,
∂2Γm (ζ )
∂ζ2
=
−2P2
w
T2
(T − τ) Γw, (59)
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where Γw , R
T
w
⊗Rw+rwrHw , Λw , RTw ⊗(pd
∑K
i=1 Ri+IM), and Ψm , (τptRm+IM)T ⊗Rw. Regarding (57),
Γm (ζ ) is composed of the channel covariance matrices that are positive definite. Hence, Γm (ζ ) as well as
Γ
−1
m (ζ ) are the positive definite matrices and Υm (ζ ) is a negative definite matrix (or equivalently −Υm (ζ )
is a positive definite matrix). Finally, following from (56), we can conclude that Um (ζ ) is a positive definite
matrix and
∂2ρ⋆m (ζ )
∂ζ2
> 0. (60)
E. Proof of Corollary 2
We can rewrite (47) as
ρ⋆m = τpt pdr
H
m
(
τqtR
T
w
⊗ qdRw + τqtqdrwrHw
)−1
rm
=
pt pd
qtqd
rHm
(
RT
w
⊗ Rw + rwrHw
)−1
rm. (61)
ρ⋆m in (61) is a decreasing function of the multiplication qtqd . Therefore, J is
J′′ :

maximize
qt,qd
qtqd
subject to τqt + (T − τ) qd = PwT,
qt ≥ 0, qd ≥ 0.
(62)
The continuation of the proof follows similar lines as the proof of Corollary 1.
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